



CENTRAL BANKS OR SINGLE  FINANCIAL AUTHORITIES? A 




This paper presents an analysis of recent trends and determinants in the architectures of financial 
supervision. We wish to explore theoretically and empirically the unification process in the 
financial sector supervision, testing our hypotheses with  sample of 69 countries.  
 
The financial supervision regimes vary significantly from country to country. A review of the   
financial supervision architectures1 indicates a trend toward a gradual concentration of supervisory 
powers. In Europe this trend toward the unification of supervisory powers has been rather strong in 
recent years: in addition to the Norway - the first country to establish a single supervisor in 1986 -  
and the Iceland (1988), five other countries, members of the European Union - Austria, Denmark 
(1988), Germany (2002), Sweden (1991) and United Kingdom(1997) -  have assigned the task of 
supervising the entire financial system to a single authority different and independent from the 
central bank.  Also four countries involved in the EU enlargement process - Estonia (1999), Latvia 
(1998), Malta (2002) and Hungary (2000) -  have reformed their structures, concentrating all the 
powers in a single authority2, while out of Europe the unified agency was established in Korea 
(1997) and Japan (2001). 
 
The aim of the theoretical, institutional and empirical analyses is therefore to discover the dynamics 
in financial supervisory regimes, and their determinants – if any - in a worldwide cross-border 
perspective.  
 
From the methodological standpoint, we develop in a delegation approach the classic intuitions of 
the new political economy3, applied in the financial supervision area4. We base our work on two 
main hypotheses: the definition of the supervisory regime is endogenous; the choice of 
policymakers to maintain or reform a given supervisory regime is constrained and influenced by the 
structural economic and institutional features of their own countries, rather than by a generic, ill-
defined social welfare function. Furthermore, it will be quite natural to acknowledge the 
suggestions of the recent new comparative economics5.  
In other words the thesis that it will be tested is the following: in a given country, the optimal 
financial supervisory design is dependent on structural economic and institutional features. Each 
financial supervisory architecture is confirmed or reformed by the policymakers, who in turn are 
influenced by the economic and institutional structure of their countries. Therefore, the financial 
supervisory architecture can be considered an endogenous variable, which depends on a set of 
medium/long-term features. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Focusing on the key issue in the debate on financial supervisory 
structure – single supervisor versus multi-authorities model – Section two claims that the optimal 
                                                 
1 The review is performed in Section four.  
2 De Luna Martinez and Rose (2001) claim there are at least other seven countries considering to adopt  a form of 
integrated  supervision: Bulgaria, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. European Central 
Bank (2003) claims that a single supervisory authority will likely be established in Belgium. 
3 For the new political economy approach see Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
4 For the theory of financial regulation see Llwellyn (1999), (2001), and Estrella (2001). 
5 For the law, endowment and finance literature see Beck, Demirguc – Kunt and Levine (2002). See also La Porta et al. 
(1998), (1999). 
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degree of unification in the financial supervisory regime cannot be defined a priori; rather it is an 
expected variable, calculated by the policymakers that maintains or reform the financial 
architectures. Therefore in Section three the adopted approach is to consider the supervisory 
structure with one or more authorities as an endogenous variable, determined in turn by the 
dynamics of other structural variables, economic and institutional, that can summarize and explain 
the political delegation process. In order to construct an endogenous variable, in Section four it is 
introduced a Financial Authorities’ Concentration Index (FAC Index), to have an indicator of the 
degree of unification of powers. Then in Section five it is considered the nature of the institutions 
involved in the control responsibilities. In particular, we must ask what role the central bank plays 
in the various national institutional settings.  It is introduced an index of the central bank's 
involvement in financial supervision, the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA 
Index). Using both the FAC Index and the CBFA Index we shed light on the current trends in the 
financial supervision architecture. In Section six, to empirically gauge the possible determinants of 
the degree of concentration of powers, it is performed an econometric analysis of the Probit and 





2. Financial Supervision Architectures: The Traditional Approach 
 
From the conceptual point of view, our starting point is obviously the blurring effect6 that current 
developments in the banking and financial industry are having on supervisory issues7. Increasing 
integration has taken place between the banking, securities and insurance markets, as well as among 
the corresponding products and instruments. The blurring effect produces in particular two 
intertwined phenomena: the emergence of financial conglomerates8, that is likely to produce 
important changes in nature and dimensions of the single intermediaries, as well as in the degree of 
consolidation of the banking and financial industry ; the growth of the securitisation of traditional 
forms of banking activities and the proliferation of sophisticated ways of bundling, repackaging and 
trading risks, that weakened the classic distinction between equity, debt and loans 9, leading changes 
in nature and dimensions of the financial markets. 
 
The financial blurring process poses at least three questions in the debate on financial supervision 
structure10: sectoral (institutional) approach versus functional approach; single supervisor model 
versus multi-authorities model; and, particularly in the European Union, centralized setting versus 
decentralized setting11. 
 
It is a fact that, in the perspective of increasing financial integration, the relevance of the first 
question has been rapidly declining. Theoretically, the sectoral approach is based on the possibility 
of separating the banking, securities and insurance markets. The progressive erosion of market 
separation is likely to cause the "default" of the institutional approach12. Institutionally, the above 
                                                 
6 See the “classic” Corrigan (1987).  
7 See Dale (1997) and White (1997). 
8 See European Commission (2002) and de Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
9 de Luna Martinez and Rose (2003). 
10 See Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002). 
11 The range of possible models for the structure of financial supervision at a national and a European level is identified 
by Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2001). 
12 For a deeper analysis see Masciandaro and Porta (2004).  See also Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002) and Schoenmaker 
(2003).
